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This study develops theory and conducts an experiment to provide an understanding of why people
initially give to charities, why they remain committed to the cause, and what factors attenuate these
influences. Using an experimental design that links donations across distinct treatments separated in
time, we present several insights. For example, we find that previous donors are more likely to give,
and contribute more, than donors asked to contribute for the first time. Yet, how these previous donors
were acquired is critical: agents who are initially attracted by signals of charitable quality transmitted
via an economic mechanism are much more likely to continue giving than agents who were initially




















  Charitable giving has historically been linked to religious activities.  Dating at 
least to ancient Egypt, religious gifts were believed to ensure a just reward in the afterlife.  
More recently, tithing has become the traditional philanthropic ideal of Christianity, 
wherein one-tenth of a person's income is expected to be contributed to charity.
1  Yet, 
charitable fund-raising has taken on a much broader role in the past several centuries.  In 
the Western world, near the mid-1800s, it was recognized that individuals and 
corporations could play a part in financing non-profit agencies with the introduction of 
new fund-raising techniques.  The most innovative techniques can be traced to the Young 
Men's Christian Association, an organization founded in London in 1844 as a response to 
unhealthy social conditions arising near the end of the Industrial Revolution.
2   
Numerous non-profit agencies quickly followed, setting in motion the vibrant 
industry of today.  In the US alone, the American Association of Fundraising Counsel 
estimates that annual giving now exceeds 2 percent of GDP.  Increased individual wealth, 
an aging population, and recent devolutionary trends across governments worldwide 
combine to set the stage for continued rapid growth in the sector.  This presents fund-
raisers, who typically rely on rules of thumb rather than hard scientific evidence, with a 
unique opportunity.  Most commentators, however, view the industry as lacking an 
appropriate understanding of the economic underpinnings to take full advantage of this 
prospect.  Fund-raising consultant Tony Kneer (The Economist, July 29
th, 2004) 
highlights this belief by noting that “There is an extraordinary amount of money 
available. The lack is of good ideas on how to get the basket under the apple tree.”  
                                                 
1 Of course, charity is important in other religions such as Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism.   
2 The new approach to fund-raising put forth by the Young Men's Christian Association—intensive drives 
over a short period of time using quite sophisticated techniques—was followed by solicitees during World 
War I, leading to the creation of the United Way.   2
Accentuating this reality is the fact that even though there has been a tremendous amount 
of new research, even the primitives of the economics of charity remain ill-understood.   
Before one can begin to advance potential solutions as to the most efficient means 
to attract and maintain donors to finance public goods, one must understand the basics of 
giving.  Even though the economics of charity has been well studied on the “supply” side 
(see, e.g., Charles Clotfelter, 1985; William Randolph, 1995; John Peloza and Peirs Steel, 
2005), critical gaps remain on the “demand” side (James Andreoni, 2006).  In this regard, 
fund-raisers have developed a variety of strategies aimed at successfully reaching specific 
funding targets, but little systematically is known about (i) what induces donors to give in 
the first place, (ii) what causes them to remain committed to the cause, and (iii) what 
factors attenuate these influences.  Answers to such questions are important not only to 
further our understanding of what theoretical models best predict behavior, but also from 
a public policy and practical viewpoint.   
The first goal of this study is to provide a theoretical foundation of charitable 
giving that examines how a donor’s historical interactions with a charitable organization 
influence contribution decisions.  The model provides a theoretical rationale to explain 
why previous donors are more likely to contribute in future campaigns, and outlines 
factors that may serve to attenuate such loyalty.  Importantly, the model highlights an 
asymmetry in the long-run effects of mechanism versus non-mechanism incentives.
3  The 
model also provides an explanation for why the appeal mode, for example door-to-door 
and mail solicitation, might be critically important.   
                                                 
3 For convenience, we denote “mechanism” effects as the choice of announcing seed money, using 
matching grants, using lotteries or auctions.  We denote “non-mechanism” effects as factors that are not 
related to economic institutional choice, such as the use of certain solicitor types.   3
A second goal of the study is to test the implications of the model.  Because our 
theory relies on a firm understanding of the temporal profile of previous gifts, it is 
important to use an approach whereby we can adequately control for the distribution of 
previous donors.  This calls for a field experiment with a relatively new charity that 
randomized previous donors into various treatment cells, and therefore has detailed 
information on all previous gifts and knowledge of what factors initially attracted donors. 
In this spirit, it is natural to organize a capital campaign for the Center for Natural 
Hazards Research at East Carolina University (ECU).  The Hazard Center was authorized 
to begin operations in the fall of 2004 by the North Carolina state government; 
importantly, there has been only one previous fund-raiser for the Center, a door-to-door 
fund-raising drive which took place in late 2004, which randomized donors into various 
treatment cells (see Landry et al., 2006).  For our purposes, the most important insights 
from Landry et al. (2006) are that linking contributions with the chance of winning a 
lottery prize and the physical appearance of female solicitors both influenced giving to 
the Hazard Center dramatically.   
In designing our field experiment, we make use of detailed information on the 
households that were previously approached and how they were approached.  The fund-
raising effort used to test our theory is centered on a door-to-door drive, but we also 
provide suggestive insights from a small-scale mail solicitation.  Both campaigns took 
place in the late spring/early summer of 2006.  We designed the campaigns to test our 
theory while maintaining the naturalness of each particular solicitation.  We randomly 
allocated previous givers (“warm” list subjects) and those who have never given (“cold” 
list subjects) into one of three treatments:  a standard voluntary contributions mechanism   4
(VCM—simply asking solicitees for money) and two gift treatments—asking solicitees 
for money, but giving a large or a small gift to the potential donors.  Our approach can 
therefore go beyond typical efforts in the literature since we are able to examine the 
dynamics of charitable fund-raising.
4   
Some interesting insights emerge that are consonant with our theory.  First, the 
warm-list enhances fund-raising success in the VCM door-to-door treatment:  donors 
who contributed in the first fund-raising drive are 19 percent more likely to give to the 
Hazards Center and provide average gifts that are roughly twice as large as households 
that have never given.  Yet, when we provide potential donors with gifts, behavior of 
warm list agents is statistically indistinguishable from that of cold list agents.  Thus, a 
donor in hand is better than two in the bush provided the mechanism used is a standard 
“simply ask for money,” or VCM.  When a solicitor has access to gifts for potential 
contributors, however, two donors in the bush are preferred to one donor in hand because 
in these treatments cold and warm list agents behave similarly.   
Second, we find a fundamental difference in the efficacy of prior mechanism and 
non-mechanism factors in our follow-up campaign.  Removing a mechanism incentive 
has no discernable impact on the behavior of warm-list households whereas removing 
non-mechanism factors leads to a reduction in average contribution levels from such 
households.  This result is consonant with the initial mechanism incentive providing an 
                                                 
4 Recent fundraising studies that explore mechanism effects include the work on the efficacy of matching 
funds (e.g., Yan Chen et al., 2006; Dean Karlan and List, 2007; Stephan Meier, 2007), seed money 
announcements (e.g., List and David Lucking-Reiley, 2002), and lotteries (e.g., John Morgan 2000; Landry 
et al. 2006; Lange et al. 2007).  None of these studies attempt to explore long run effects of giving, except 
Meier (2007), who finds that in the long run those who received the match give less than the control group.  
Although not a study in the spirit of these mechanisms, Jen Shang and Rachel Croson (2007) also explore 
the amounts individuals give over time. 
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enduring signal of charitable quality.  In this case, a donor in hand is better than two in 
the bush provided the mechanism that first attracted the donor transmitted a signal that 
enhanced charitable quality.  
Finally, we find that the loyalty of previous donors is attenuated when we change 
the appeal mode.  While warm-list households that originally gave in a door-to-door 
campaign are more likely to donate in a subsequent mail solicitation than a randomly 
selected individual, the noisiness of the data precludes strong inference.  Comparing rates 
of giving and gift sizes across our two campaigns yields a data pattern that is consistent 
with several models, including one whereby social pressure is an important factor 
influencing solicitees.  Overall, these results highlight the potential usefulness of moving 
beyond an experimental design that focuses on short run substitution effects, and provide 
a deeper understanding of which theoretical models best predict donor behavior. 
The remainder of our study proceeds as follows.  The next section provides the 
theoretical framework on which we base our field experiment.  Section III describes our 
field experimental design.  Section IV summarizes our findings and Section V concludes.  
I. Theoretical Model 
 
To provide direction to our field experimental design, we extend the models 
presented in Andreoni (1989, 1990) and Landry et al. (2006) to account for historical 
interactions with the charity.  A key feature of our model is that it incorporates a 
composite utility component, whose realization may depend upon both the interpersonal 
interaction between potential donor and solicitor and the fund-raising method.   
We model an agent i∈Ω whose utility is additively separable into utility  i u  from 
consuming a numeraire good, i y , utility  ( ) i hG θ  from a public good provided at some   6
aggregate level G , and a composite utility term,  ( ) i f • .  Throughout, we assume that 
() i h •  is increasing and concave and that  {0,1} θ ∈  reflects whether the charity is of high 
( 1 θ = ) or low ( 0 θ = ) quality.  The composite utility term is multidimensional, including 
both a warm glow component as well as a disutility of not giving.  
We allow each of these three utility components to depend on the current fund-
raising mechanism  c M  employed by the charity.   c M  encompasses both the institution 
utilized and the mode of appeal (door-to-door or mail solicitation), and therefore the 
interpersonal interaction.  In particular, we allow that interpersonal interactions can 
influence both the shape and magnitude of  ( ) i f • .
5  This term therefore implicitly 
includes both the extent to which a donor’s actions are observed and the characteristics of 
the solicitor observing such actions. 
We assume that agents have incomplete information regarding the true value of 
the public good but attach a probability  [0,1] i μ ∈  that the charity is of high quality—i.e., 
() i hG θ =  () G hi .
6  As discussed in Lise Vesterlund (2003), a charity can gain credibility 
and thereby increase  i μ  by using mechanisms ( c M ) that provide credible signals of 
charitable quality.  Such approaches include the provision of matching funds/gifts to 
potential donors or the announcement of seed money and lottery prizes.
7  Intuitively, we 
expect this effect to depend on both the current and previous interactions between 
                                                 
5 In many regards, our composite utility term generalizes the “moral” component of utility discussed in 
Steven D. Levitt and List (2007).  Importantly the definition of our composite utility term allows decisions 
to vary based on the extent to which actions are scrutinized by expectant others.  
6 Note that  [0,1] i μ ∈  thereby coincides with the expected value of θ  ( 1( 1 ) 0 μ μμ = +− ii i ).  In the 
following, we therefore base the discussion on μi  only.  
7 Andreoni (1998) discusses a different effect of seed money:  seed money in his model provides a device 
to eliminate zero-contribution equilibrium in a threshold public good game.     7
solicitee and charity—i.e., both the current  c M  and any previously used fund-raising 
mechanisms,  p M , are expected to affect the instantaneous realization of 
(, ) ii c p MM μ μ = . 
In choosing her donation level  i b , agent i derives utility according to:  
(1)   () () ( ) ( ) ( ) c i i i P c i c i i i i M b f G h M M M b y u V ; , ; + + = μ      
In our model, numeraire consumption, is determined by the budget of the agent, 
() () C i i i i C i i M b R b w M b y ; ; + − = , where  ( ) C i i M b R ;  denotes any potential private 
monetary or consumption benefits conveyed by a particular fund-raising drive.  Finally, 
we assume that  ( ) i f •  is concave in  i b  and both  ( ) i u •  and  ( ) i h •  are (strictly) increasing 
and concave.   
 Agent  i selects a contribution level to maximize utility and contributes a positive 
amount if 
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* * , where  ( ) c M C  represents any expenditures—i.e., 
lottery prizes/gifts—accrued by a charity employing a particular mechanism.    8
A. Contribution Decisions and the Choice of Fund-raising Mechanism 
In many fund-raising campaigns, charities place importance on both participation 
rates and aggregate contribution levels.  As such, it is important to examine individual 
participation rates in conjunction with aggregate contribution levels.  We therefore 
analyze how the current choice of fund-raising mechanism  c M  impacts the left-hand 
sides of equations (2) and (3).  We highlight three distinct channels through which the 
choice of a particular fund-raising mechanism can influence such decisions.   
First, recall that we allow numeraire consumption  ( ) C i i M b y ;  to depend on the 
private monetary/consumption benefits  ( ) C i i M b R ;  conveyed by participation in a fund-
raising drive.  Fund-raisers can thus influence numeraire consumption by selecting 
mechanisms such as charitable lotteries or donor gifts that provide a direct link between 
private benefits and contribution decisions.  This would lead to gains on both the 
intensive and extensive margins – i.e., changes in conditions (2) and (3), respectively.  
Second, the (expected) utility from the public good,  (, ) ( ) icp i M Mh G μ , may be 
increased by announcing seed money donations, lottery prizes, or providing gifts to 
potential donors.  If so, then we would expect such mechanisms to induce greater 
aggregate contribution levels.  As previously used fund-raising mechanisms  p M  may 
have altered the perceived credibility of the charity, however, we allow an interaction 
between historical and current mechanisms.
8   
                                                 
8 For example, the marginal effect of providing donor gifts on the perceived credibility of the charity may 
differ across households previously approached in a charitable lottery and those previously approached in a 
VCM (or those approached for the first time). 
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Finally, the composite utility term  ( ) i f •  may depend upon non-monetary factors, 
such as the characteristics of a solicitor in a door-to-door fund-raising drive or the appeal 
mode.  Consonant with this notion, Landry et al. (2006) find that solicitor characteristics, 
such as female physical attractiveness, influence giving.  Likewise, social pressures may 
be greater in door-to-door fund-raising efforts than in mail solicitations.  If agents receive 
disutility from not giving, and such feelings are related to the extent actions are observed 
by others (such as an expecting solicitor), then the appeal mode might have important 
effects on giving.  
B. Warm-list vs. cold- list 
Fund-raising strategists typically rank building and maintaining a “donor 
development pyramid” as the most important aspect of a successful long-term fund-
raising effort.  While we are unable to find any clean empirical evidence that quantifies 
the value of a warm-list, our model highlights factors important in measuring the value of 
a warm-list agent.  We partition the set Ω  of agents into two types: (i) individuals who 
have never given to the charity, (
CL Ω , cold list) and (ii) previous givers to the charity 
(
WL Ω , warm-list):   
( 4 )       
WL CL Ω ΩΩ = ∪       
The set of cold-list agents, 
CL Ω , will contain some agents who elect to contribute to the 
charity (reflecting characteristics similar to an agent drawn from the warm-list) and some 
who do not contribute to the charity.   
Under our model, those who have contributed in a prior campaign reveal either a 
high marginal valuation for the public good or a high realization of the composite utility 
term—i.e., a large warm glow or a distaste for not giving.  Ceteris paribus, we would   10
thus expect that warm-list households are more likely to contribute and provide larger 
donations than a randomly approached household.  However, the economic value of a 
warm-list depends on how the marginal donor was acquired, which will influence their 
propensity to give in future campaigns. 
For example, as noted in Landry et al. (2006), both lottery incentives and the 
attractiveness of female solicitors can be used to elicit contributions from extra-marginal 
donors.  Yet, these two effects work through entirely different channels in our model.  
Charitable lotteries alter consumption utility and may serve to signal charitable quality.  
In contrast, beauty works solely via the instantaneous realization of the composite utility 
term.  As such, the long-run impact of these mechanisms for the marginal donor could 
differ substantially.   
As a thought experiment, consider the marginal donor who contributed previously 
to a physically attractive solicitor in a VCM.  If such an agent is approached in a follow-
up campaign by a solicitor of average attractiveness in a similar VCM, the realization of 
the composite utility term would be lower.  Ceteris paribus, we would therefore expect a 
weakly lower contribution from such an agent.  Alternatively, if this marginal donor was 
attracted via a lottery incentive, future contributions might remain high if the lottery sent 
an important quality signal that is durable; on the other hand, removing the lottery 
incentive might lower contributions because ceteris paribus it reduces consumption 
utility and could undermine prior quality signals.   
II. Experimental Design 
  We designed a door-to-door fund-raising drive and a parallel mail solicitation to 
explore various aspects of the theoretical model.  In each appeal mode, we use three basic   11
treatments—a VCM, a small gift treatment, and a large gift treatment.
9  We begin with a 
summary of the original Landry et al. (2006) design, and proceed to our door-to-door and 
mail solicitation field experiments. 
A. Precursors 
The Center for Natural Hazards Research at ECU was authorized to begin 
operations in the fall of 2004 by the North Carolina state government.  The Hazard 
Center was founded in response to the widespread devastation in eastern North Carolina 
caused by hurricanes Dennis and Floyd, and designed to provide support and 
coordination for research on natural hazard risks.   
The Hazard Center conducted an initial capital campaign in the Fall of 2004.  As 
reported in Landry et al. (2006), this initial campaign was a completely randomized 
design that randomized households into various treatments.  The experimental treatments 
were conducted on four weekends between October 2nd and November 13th, 2004.   
Their design resulted in a sample of 4833 households approached—1186 in a VCM 
treatment, 1282 in a seed money treatment, and 2356 in a lottery treatment.  Of the 
households approached, a total of 1755 answered the door and spoke to a solicitor, and 
522 made a contribution to the Hazard Center.  
Importantly, we have data detailing the manner in which the households were 
initially approached along with the size of their gift.  Further, as explained below, there 
has been no subsequent contact with the donors until our second set of field treatments.  
                                                 
9 Our gift treatments included both conditional and unconditional small and large gift treatments with 
various price points.  Herein we pool these gift data into “small” and “large.”  While conditionality does 
matter in terms of levels of gifts, the treatment effects of interest in this study are not influenced by this 
distinction.  Hence, for parsimony we pool the data.  We direct the reader to the supplementary appendix on 
the AER website for results examining the data split along conditional and unconditional treatments. 
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In this new set of field treatments, we approach households that have given in the past 
and households that have never given, randomizing them into one of the three door-to-
door or mail solicitation treatments.
10  
Before proceeding, we should note that the mission of the Hazard Center—to 
provide support and coordination for research on natural hazard risk—is of importance 
when interpreting our results.  It is well understood amongst economists that individuals 
are more generous in the wake of emergency situations (see, e.g., Christopher Douty, 
1972; Louis De Alessi, 1975; Jack Hirshleifer, 1987).  Although the initial capital 
campaign for the Hazard Center was conducted nearly five years after Hurricanes Floyd 
and Dennis devastated eastern North Carolina in 1999, it is possible that some of our 
initial donors may have given in response to the memory of these events.  Given that the 
long-term effects of such events on donor behavior are unknown, there may be added 
noise when extrapolating results on dynamics from our setting to charitable fund-raising 
in general.  However, it is important to note that these past events should not correlate 
with any of our treatments.  
B.  Door-to-Door Fund-raiser 
In each of our three door-to-door treatments, households in predetermined 
neighborhood blocks in Pitt County, North Carolina were approached by a paid solicitor 
and asked if they would like to make a contribution.  The neighborhood blocks were 
selected to provide a representative sample of two distinct household types in each of the 
                                                 
10 To increase the number of warm-list households, we pool data from Landry et al. (2006) with that from 
the gift exchange treatments in Uri Gneezy and List (2006).  Solicitors in Gneezy and List (2006) spoke 
with 645 households in a lottery treatment and elicited contributions from 315 (or 48.9%) of these 
individuals.  The sole difference across these two experiments is that solicitors in Gneezy and List (2006) 
were informed that their wages would be doubled after arriving for their first day of work.  Importantly, 
solicitors in the two studies were recruited and trained using the same protocol and every aspect of the 
interaction between solicitor and potential donor was identical.      13
three treatments: (i) households that contributed to the Hazard Center in the first fund-
raising effort and (ii) households that have never contributed.
11     
  Households that answered the door were provided an informational brochure 
detailing the activities of the Hazard Center since its inception in 2004 and read a fixed 
script that outlined the reason for the solicitor’s visit.  The script included a brief 
introduction that informed the resident of who the solicitors were, the purpose of their 
visit, a two-sentence summary of the non-profit organization, and a description of the gift 
(when applicable).  Copies of the informational brochure and solicitation script are 
provided in Appendix 1. 
  Across all treatments, potential donors were informed that proceeds raised in the 
campaign would be used to fund research that benefits Pitt County and the surrounding 
area.  In the small gift treatment, potential donors were provided a bookmark containing 
the logo of either the Hazard Center or ECU as a gift from the Hazard Center.  In the 
large gift treatment, potential donors were provided a copy of the book Freakonomics as 
a gift from the Hazard Center.  While these two goods might not be in exactly the same 
dimension (i.e., same gift but larger, as in Armin Falk, 2007), they are both related to an 
academic endeavor; and given the thickness of the book market for best sellers several 
bookmarks could be had for one Freakonomics book. 
  Table 1 summarizes the door-to-door portion of the experimental design.  The 
experimental treatments were conducted between April 21
st and June 24
th, 2006 with six 
sessions conducted between 9am and 5pm on Saturday and another five sessions 
                                                 
11 Category (ii) household types can be more finely split:  (a) those that were visited in the first effort but 
elected not to contribute and (b) those that did not speak to a solicitor in the first fund-raising drive.  Since 
the qualitative results do not change, we pool these household types but we note that empirical results more 
finely splitting the data can be found in the tabled results on the AER website.   14
conducted on Wednesday and Thursday evenings between 5pm and 8pm.  Our design 
resulted in a sample of 4186 total households approached—878 in the VCM, 1148 in the 
small gift, and 1142 in the large gift.
12  Of the households approached, 1039 answered the 
door and spoke to a solicitor, and 277 made a contribution to the Hazard Center.  Of the 
households that answered the door, 151 were warm-list households that contributed to the 
Hazard Center in 2004 and 888 were cold-list households that were not approached (or 
chose not to contribute to the Hazard Center) in the earlier door-to-door campaign.   
C. Recruiting and Training of Solicitors 
  As Table 1 reveals, we employed a within-solicitor design using a total of thirty-
two unique solicitors.  Of the thirty-two solicitors employed in our experiment, nineteen 
participated in the VCM treatment, twenty-four participated in the small gift treatment, 
and sixteen participated in the large gift treatment.
13  To control for possible order effects, 
solicitors were randomly assigned to treatments, and we were careful to run multiple 
treatments in every round of the experiment.   
  Each solicitor’s experience followed four steps: (1) consideration of an invitation 
to work as a paid volunteer for the research center, (2) an in-person interview, (3) a 
training session, and (4) participation as a solicitor in the door-to-door campaign.
14  
Undergraduate solicitors were recruited from the student body at ECU via flyers posted 
around campus, announcements on a university electronic bulletin board, advertisements 
                                                 
12 We approached a total of 274 warm-list households—74 in the VCM, 98 in the small gift treatment, and 
102 in the large gift treatment.  We would have preferred a larger sample of such households and revisited 
many of those who did not answer the door.  Unfortunately the costs of such efforts became prohibitive and 
we were unable to speak with approximately 45 percent of the targeted warm-list households.   
13 Twelve of our solicitors worked in a single treatment.  Of the remaining twenty solicitors, thirteen 
participated in two of the treatments and seven participated in all three treatments.     
14 A portion of the experimental design write-up follows Landry et al. (2006) since recruitment and training 
was similar.   
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in the local campus newspaper, and direct appeal to student groups and students enrolled 
in undergraduate economics courses.  All potential solicitors were told that they would be 
paid $10 per hour and would be expected to work multiple days.  Interested solicitors 
were instructed to contact the Economics Department to schedule an interview. 
  Initial ten-minute interviews were conducted in private offices of the Economics 
Department faculty.  Upon arrival to the interview, students completed an application 
form and a short survey questionnaire.
15  Upon concluding the interview, every applicant 
was offered employment as a solicitor.  Once hired, all solicitors attended a one-hour 
training session conducted by the same researcher.  The training sessions provided the 
solicitor with background/historical information of the Hazard Center and reviewed the 
data collection procedures.  Next, the trainer reviewed the solicitation script for the VCM 
treatment and explained the procedures for distributing gifts to potential donors.  At the 
conclusion of the training session, the solicitors practiced the script for the VCM 
treatment in front of the trainer and other personnel in the Economics Department.  When 
necessary, the trainer provided immediate feedback to the solicitor on ways in which the 
pitch could be improved.   
D. Further Solicitor Information: Rating Physical Appearance 
  In the final step, we gathered one last piece of information.  In the spirit of the 
procedures of Jeffrey Biddle and Daniel Hamermesh (1998), we derived measures of 
physical attractiveness for each solicitor.  Digital photographs of each solicitor were 
randomly allocated into files that contained the pictures of three other solicitors and 
independently evaluated by 175 different observers—undergraduate students from a large 
                                                 
15 The application form and survey questionnaire are identical to those employed in Landry et al. (2006). 
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introductory-level economics course at the University of Maryland–College Park.  Each 
observer evaluated twelve different photographs and was asked to place each photograph 
on a scale of (1) homely, extremely unattractive, to (10) model beautiful or handsome.  
Each rater’s scores were normalized to yield a standardized scale (distributed as a 
standard normal) across different raters.  To generate our final personal attractiveness 
measure, the standardized ratings for each solicitor were averaged over all evaluators. 
Before proceeding to the mail solicitation discussion, we should highlight a few 
important design issues.  First, as previously noted, in carrying out our door-to-door 
campaign we wished to solicit donors in a way that matched how fund-raisers carry out 
the task in the field.  Second, in order to provide a formal, standardized appearance, 
solicitors were given an attractive ECU t-shirt and were instructed to wear khaki pants (or 
shorts) during their door-to-door solicitations.  Third, each solicitor wore an identification 
badge that included his or her picture, name, and city solicitation permit number.  Fourth, 
solicitors distributed an information brochure after introducing themselves to potential 
donors.  Fifth, we randomly allocated solicitors across neighborhoods and treatment type, 
and solicitors remained in the same treatment throughout each given session.  Sixth, 
households were randomized into treatments and we attempted to provide temporal 
variation in both solicitor characteristics as well as mechanism type. 
  Finally, to summarize, we have gathered a rich set of solicitor and household 
control variables.  Not only do we have measures of several potentially relevant solicitor 
attributes (race, gender, and beauty), we also have gathered data on the households that 
our solicitors approached.  After the interaction with the household, each solicitor   17
completed data collection forms that included the estimated age, gender, and race of the 
potential contributor. 
E.  Mail Solicitation 
  To complement the door-to-door fund-raiser, we ran a parallel mail solicitation 
natural field experiment to provide a further test of the theoretical model.  Similar to the 
door-to-door drive, we allocated a certain number of households to one of the several 
treatments.  We were careful not to place a household in more than one treatment and 
each household was only contacted once—either in the door-to-door drive or the mail 
solicitation.  Again, we examined behavior across the two household types: households 
that have and have not previously contributed to the Hazard Center.   
  In total, we mailed 6563 solicitation letters across our three treatments—1837 in 
the VCM treatment, 3783 in the small gift treatment, and 943 in the large gift.  Each 
mailing contained a copy of the informational brochure detailing the activities of the 
Hazard Center since its inception in 2004 and a solicitation letter.  A copy of the 
solicitation letter is included in Appendix B.  Previous donors accounted for 
approximately 8.5 percent of the sample (or 555 of the 6563 total letters mailed).  In 
keeping with best fund-raising practices, we included a sentence in the solicitation letter 
for previous donors thanking them for their donation in 2004 and expressing our hope 
that they will continue their generosity.     
  It should be noted that in preparing the letters for the mail survey, we used the 
White Pages on-line to gather the name associated with a given address and were unable 
to find a listing for approximately 25.1 percent (1649 of 6563) of all households.  Letters 
sent to such a household for were addressed to “Pitt County Resident”.  As none of these   18
letters were returned with a donation, we restrict the sample to the 4914 households that 
received a personalized greeting—1363 in the VCM, 2831 in the small gift treatment, and 
720 in the large gift treatment.  Of these 4914 households, 399 (or approximately 8.1 
percent) are warm-list individuals.            
III. Experimental Results 
  We begin with a discussion of the door-to-door fund-raising results and then 
summarize results from the mail solicitation.   
A.  Door-to-Door Fund-raiser 
Table 2 presents summary statistics, including information on the success of the 
various treatments, as well as solicitor and household characteristics.  Table 2 indicates, 
for example, that our solicitors approached 878 households in the VCM treatment, and 
spoke with 286 of these households, of which 21.3 percent (61 of 286) contributed to the 
Hazard Center.  In total, we raised approximately $2602 (or $2.96 per solicitation) for the 
Hazard Center: $543.40 in the VCM treatment ($1.90 per solicitation), $677 in the small 
gift treatment ($1.82 per solicitation), and $1361.40 in the large gift treatment ($3.68 per 
solicitation). 
  The Golden Rule in fund-raising emphasizes that securing a warm-list is essential 
to long-term viability.  While we cannot test this Golden Rule directly, to our best 
knowledge little formal evidence exists concerning whether, and to what extent, previous 
donors remain committed to the cause.  Our data set is sufficiently rich to examine these 
issues by matching our new field experimental data with the data contained in Landry et 
al. (2006).  A first result emerges: 
Result 1:  Warm-list households are more likely to give and provide larger 
average contributions per contact.   
   19
Preliminary evidence for this result can be found in column 1 (second and third panels) of 
Table 2, which summarizes the contribution decisions of warm and cold list households.  
Table 2 indicates, for example, that our solicitors had a chance to speak with 40 warm-list 
households in the VCM treatment, of which 40 percent (16 of 40) contributed to the 
Hazard Center.  This figure far exceeds the 18.3 percent giving rate among cold list 
agents.  Furthermore, considering average contributions, a warm-list household in our 
VCM treatment gave $4.75 whereas the average donation of a household that has never 
given was $1.44.  Figures 1 and 2 complement these insights by providing a graphical 
depiction of differences across household type.  These figures highlight that both 
participation rates and average contributions are higher among previous donors. 
Using solicitor specific average earnings per treatment as the unit of observation, 
we find that the $3.21 difference in average donations between warm and cold-list 
households in the VCM is significant at the p < 0.05 level.  When comparing differences 
in participation rates, we find that the approximate 20 percentage point difference is also 
statistically significant at the p < 0.05.  To complement these unconditional statistical 
insights, we estimate a series of linear regression models that explicitly control for 
observable and unobservable differences across solicitors.  Specifically, following 
Landry et al. (2006), we estimate a regression model of the amount contributed for each 
household that answered the door (including zero contributions) on dummy variables for 
our experimental treatments and other covariates:
16 
(5)     ij ij ij ij X Z L ε β δ + + =  ,                               
                                                 
16 Qualitative insights are similar if we use a Tobit specification or if we estimate a standard two-stage 
selection equation with the yes-no contribution decision modeled in the first stage and the dollars 
contributed in the second.  We direct the reader to the AER website for these robustness tests.   20
where Lij is the contribution level of the j
th household to the i
th solicitor, Z is a vector of 
treatment group status indicators, and X is a vector of other covariates – including 
observable characteristics of potential donors and donor-specific controls for warm- and 
cold-list households.  To account for unobservable heterogeneities at the solicitor level, 
we include solicitor fixed effects.  
  To gain insights into the factors that influence the decision of households to 
contribute to the Hazard Center, we estimate a linear probability model of the 
contribution decision of households that answered the door: 
(6)     ij ij ij ij e X Z C + + = β δ ,                  
where Cij equals unity if solicitor i received a contribution from household j, and equals 
zero otherwise.  We again include solicitor fixed effects.   
  These empirical estimates are contained in Model A of Tables 3 and 4.  In terms 
of average contribution decisions, Model A in Table 3 provides insights consistent with 
our unconditional results:  warm-list households contribute an average of $1.29 more to 
the Hazard Center than a cold-list household, with this difference being significant at the 
p < 0.05 level.  Model A in Table 4 reports that this effect is partly driven by increased 
participation:  warm-list households are 13 percent more likely to contribute to the 
Hazard Center than a household approached for the first time.   
 Exploring  this  result  a level deeper, leads to a second result:   
Result 2:  Differences in contribution patterns between warm and cold list 
households are only found in the VCM treatment—in the gift treatments previous 
donors and cold-list households behave similarly. 
 
Evidence for this result is contained in Model B in Tables 3 and 4, which permits the 
warm-list effect to be heterogeneous across our gift and VCM treatments.  For example,   21
empirical estimates in Table 3 for Model B suggest that a warm-list household in our 
VCM treatment contributes $3.14 more than a counterpart cold-list household with this 
difference significant at the p < 0.05 level.  However, warm-list households in our gift 
treatments behave no differently than a household approached for the first time in the gift 
treatment:  the $0.19 ($1.06) increase in contributions from warm-list households in our 
small (large) gift treatments is not significant at any meaningful level.   
  Further, our data suggest that warm-list households contribute more in the VCM 
than either gift treatment with the approximate $2.88 difference between the VCM and 
small gift treatments significant at the p < 0.05 level.
17  In contrast, cold-list counterparts 
contribute more in both gift treatments than in the VCM with the $2.07 difference 
between the large gift and VCM treatments significant at the p < 0.05 level.   
  Model B in Table 4 reports similar differences for participation rates.  For 
example, warm-list households in our VCM (small gift) treatment are approximately 19 
percent (14 percent) more likely to contribute to the Hazard Center than a cold-list 
counterpart with both of these differences being statistically significant at the p < 0.05 
level.  Yet, there is no statistically significant difference in participation rates for warm- 
and cold-list households in our large gift treatment nor is there a significant difference in 
participation rates for warm-list households across our VCM and gift treatments.  In 
contrast, cold-list households are 14–17 percent more likely to contribute when 
approached in a gift treatment with these differences significant at the p < 0.05 level. 
                                                 
17 The average contribution level of a warm-list household in the small gift (large gift) treatment is given by 
the sum of the coefficients for the overall model constant, the indicator for a small gift (large gift) 
treatment, and the indicator for a warm-list household in the small gift (large gift) treatment.  The average 
contribution level of a warm-list household in the VCM is simply the sum of the overall model constant 
and the indicator for a warm-list household in the VCM treatment.  For cold-list households, the marginal 
effect of a small (large) gift is simply given by the coefficient on the indicator for a small (large) gift 
treatment.   22
  Combined, these insights form a third result: 
Result 3:  Cold-list households are influenced by the presence of a gift, whereas 
previous donors are less influenced by gifts. 
 
In sum, Results 2 and 3 suggest an important consideration for practitioners in the field 
when designing capital campaigns.  Prior donors do not require added incentives to 
induce contributions; in fact, providing such incentives to warm-list households may 
actually crowd-out contributions.  Figure 3 complements this insight by showing the 
current and prior donation amounts for warm-list households across our various 
treatments.  The figure highlights an interesting pattern of behavior: households 
approached in our VCM contribute more than in the initial fundraising drive whereas 
those approached in a gift treatment contribute less than in the initial campaign.
18   
One interesting aspect of our data is that they suggest a potential conflict between 
intrinsic and extrinsic motives for giving—particularly for small incentives (gifts).  For 
prior donors (perhaps intrinsically motivated individuals), there is a significant reduction 
in average contribution levels when provided with a small donor gift (see Bruno S. Frey 
and Felix Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, 2000).  In contrast, 
even small extrinsic incentives have a positive effect on those households who had never 
given.             
B. Long-Run Impacts of Mechanism Incentives 
 
  The above results provide insights into why people initially give to charities, and 
what factors delineate warm and cold list solicitees.  Yet, our data permit us to explore 
                                                 
18 One aspect of our setting that deserves further investigation is how the presence of gifts is related to 
perceived charity overhead, and how the gift exacerbates or attenuates our treatment effect differences 
across warm and cold list agents.  Little is known about these questions, but the evidence is mixed 
concerning the relationship between overhead ratios and giving rates (see, e.g., Woods Bowman, 2006, and 
the work of Richard Steinberg).  This represents an interesting area of future research.   23
deeper into specific variables that might influence why previous donors remain 
committed to the cause.  A key insight in John Morgan (2000), Morgan and Martin 
Sefton (2000), and Landry et al. (2006) is the efficacy of lotteries as an instrument to 
raise funds for the provision of public goods.  For example, Landry et al. (2006) find that 
charitable lotteries induce higher participation rates and greater average contribution 
levels than those observed in VCM treatments.  Conceptually, charitable lotteries can 
induce a greater level of giving for at least two reasons:  (i) the announcement of lottery 
prizes can signal the credibility of the charity via the signaling theories discussed above 
and/or (ii) the provision of lottery prizes change monetary incentives and may induce 
higher contribution rates.  As these effects work through different channels in our model, 
the effect of removing lottery incentives on the marginal donor is ex ante ambiguous.     
For instance, if the signaling story is mainly responsible for the increased 
participation rates observed in Landry et al. (2006), then the marginal donor will continue 
to give at rates higher than counterparts initially attracted by the VCM—provided that 
prior quality signals carry through to future campaigns.  Alternatively, if the marginal 
donors were initially attracted by the lure of the lottery prize itself, or if prior quality 
signals are mitigated in future campaigns, then we would expect lower relative giving 
rates amongst these donor types upon removal of the lottery incentive.  Such an empirical 
test is quite demanding of the data given that our fund-raising drives were separated by 
one and one-half years.  Nevertheless, to provide a test of these competing explanations, 
we return to equations (5) and (6) and augment the models to yield a first result:   
Result 4:  Donors initially attracted by mechanisms that can signal charitable 
quality are weakly more loyal to the cause than donors attracted by a VCM.   
   24
Empirical evidence for this result is contained in Model C in Tables 3 and 4 and the 
difference-in-differences estimates presented in Table 5.  Results in Tables 3 and 4 
suggest that even though the previous lottery treatment attracted considerably more 
donors than the VCM attracted, these donor types remain weakly more loyal to the cause:  
warm-list households that contributed in a prior lottery (VCM) treatment give average 
gifts that are approximately $1.57 ($0.65) greater than those observed at households 
approached for the first time.
19   
Further, in Table 4 we find that the probability of eliciting a contribution from a 
donor initially attracted by the lottery is 17 percent greater than a household approached 
for the first time, a difference that is more than three times larger than the 5 percent effect 
observed for those initially attracted by the VCM.  Yet, neither this twelve percent 
difference in participation rates nor the $0.92 difference in average contributions across 
donor types is statistically significant at conventional levels (however, the difference 
nearly reaches the p < 0.10 level of significance in Table 4).  Importantly, for our 
purposes, results in Tables 3 and 4 reveal that there is little evidence suggesting that 
removing the lottery incentives has a negative impact on donor behavior.   
A stronger test of whether lotteries signal charitable quality is to compare 
individual changes in donation levels for households originally approached in a VCM 
with those for households originally attracted by a lottery.  In this spirit, we provide 
Table 5 which extends our analysis to consider the manner in which the donor was 
acquired.  To construct the numbers in Table 5 we first compute the average 
                                                 
19 Similar results emerge if we allow the lottery effect to differ for households from single- and multiple-
prize treatments—both participation rates and average donations are greater than those for households from 
a prior VCM.  Given this result, it is important to note that there were no discernable differences in either 
participation rates or average contributions across lottery treatments in Landry et al. (2006).    25
contributions in both the current and prior fund-raising efforts for two household types: 
(i) those who gave initially in a VCM and (ii) those who gave initially in a lottery 
treatment.  We then compare the difference in these averages along with the difference-
in-differences.  Figures in Table 5 can be read as follows:  households originally 
approached in a lottery (VCM) treatment give $0.05 less ($2.00 less) on average in the 
current fund-raiser.  The $1.95 difference-in-differences estimate is statistically 
significant at the p < 0.10 level.   
Together, these two insights combined with the lottery results in Landry et al. 
(2006) highlight the significant benefits from lotteries.  For practitioners in the field, 
Result 4 is important since it provides support for a “double-dividend” when one uses 
charitable lotteries.  The increased participation rates induced via charitable lotteries 
provides not only current benefits but also a larger warm-list that leads to greater 
contributions in future fund-raising drives.   
C. Long-Run Impacts of Non-Mechanism Incentives 
 
  Having examined the impact of altering institutional factors on donor behavior, 
we now explore the effect of changing non-mechanism effects, such as solicitor 
appearance.  Landry et al. (2006) provide insights which reveal that attractive females 
elicited greater rates of participation and average contributions than other solicitor types:  
a one standard deviation increase in female solicitor physical attractiveness is similar to 
that of the lottery incentive.  As noted in our theoretical model, such factors effect 
contribution decisions via the realization of the composite utility term.  Ceteris paribus 
we would thus expect such solicitor specific characteristics to have no lasting impact on 
behavior in future capital campaigns.  Our data are sufficiently rich to allow us to explore   26
this conjecture by systematically changing the physical characteristics—i.e., gender and 
physical appearance—of the solicitor approaching a household.  In doing so, we report a 
next result: 
Result 5:  Donors initially attracted by non-mechanism factors do not remain 
loyal to the charitable cause.   
 
To provide evidence for this result, we classify solicitors into two types—
attractive white females and all other solicitors—and divide warm-list households into 
three groups; (i) those visited by the same solicitor type on both occasions, (ii) those 
visited in the original study by an attractive white female, and in the current study by 
some other solicitor type, and (iii) those visited in the current study by an attractive white 
female, and in the original study by some other solicitor type.  Under this classification, 
households in group (ii) represent those for which we removed an important non-
institutional incentive and those in group (iii) represent those for which we have 
introduced a previously non-existent incentive—white female beauty.     
  Figure 4 illustrates the effect of changing beauty effects by summarizing average 
contributions in the current and prior fund-raising drives for warm-list households visited 
by two different solicitor types.  The figure highlights an interesting pattern of behavior: 
removing the non-institutional beauty incentive leads to reduction in average contribution 
levels whereas introducing a non-institutional incentive generates an increase in average 
contributions.  Pooled over all treatments, when we remove a pre-existing beauty 
incentive, households contribute approximately 27.6 percent less ($3.30 versus $4.21) 
than they did in the initial fund-raising drive.  In contrast, when we introduce new beauty 
incentives, average contributions increase by approximately 36.2 percent ($4.85 versus   27
$3.56).  As noted in Table 5, however, the $2.20 difference-in-differences is not 
statistically significant at any meaningful level.
20   
  Combined with insights garnered in Result 4, these data suggest a fundamental 
difference in the efficacy of institutional versus non-institutional factors:  while both 
factors lead to increased participation rates and average donations in the short-run, only 
institutional factors influence contribution decisions in future fund-raising drives.  Hence 
the manner in which previous donors are acquired is an important determinant of 
behavior in future campaigns.  Consistent with the model, donors who are initially 
attracted by mechanisms that potentially signal charitable quality—i.e., charitable 
lotteries or the announcement of seed money—are more likely to remain loyal than those 
enticed by non-mechanism factors that operate via warm-glow (or the realization of our 
composite utility term).   
D.  Mail Solicitation 
  Comparing empirical results across the door-to-door and the mail solicitations 
allows us to provide a first, albeit rough, test of the importance of changing approaches 
within fund-raising drives and evaluating whether our findings translate across different 
appeal modes.  Yet, we should take great care when interpreting these results both 
because of the small number of donators in the mail solicitation and the fact that many 
important variables change when moving from the door-to-door drive to the mail 
solicitation (e.g., the gift is present in the door-to-door conditional gift treatment, but not 
                                                 
20 As noted in Table 5, similar insights emerge if we expand the analysis to consider changes in female 
beauty rather than restricting the sample to Caucasian females only.  Consonant with results from Landry et 
al. (2006) such differences are less pronounced because the influence of beauty for minorities is less 
pronounced than for their Caucasian counterparts.   28
in the mail campaign).  In the end, we view the data patterns presented in this section as 
merely suggestive, and representing fertile areas for future research. 
Table 6 presents summary statistics from our mail solicitation field experiment, 
which includes information on the success of the various treatments across all households 
pooled and the subset of warm-list households.  Table 6 indicates, for example, that we 
sent 1363 letters in the VCM treatment and received donations from two (or 0.15 percent) 
of these households.
21  In total, we raised $560 (or approximately $0.11 per solicitation) 
for the Hazard Center: $125 in the VCM treatment, $240 in the small gift treatment, and 
$195 in the large gift treatment.   
  A striking feature of Table 6 is the substantial reduction in response rates and 
corresponding increase in conditional contribution levels relative to our door-to-door 
campaign.  For example, in our VCM treatment only 0.15 percent of the 1363 households 
who received a letter made a contribution to the Hazard Center.  In contrast, 21.3 percent 
of the 286 households contacted (and 6.94 percent of the 878 households approached) in 
a VCM in the door-to-door component of the experiment elected to donate to the Hazard 
Center.  Examining conditional contributions, we observe the direct opposite: households 
in the mail study contributed nearly seven-fold more ($62.50 versus $8.92) than those 
approached door-to-door.   
Combined, these data are in line with recent results from laboratory experiments, 
which suggest the important influence of the nature and extent of scrutiny on individual 
behavior.  In the door-to-door drive, actions are directly observed by an expectant 
outsider—perhaps leading to increased participation amongst marginal agents for whom 
                                                 
21 We restrict the sample to only those 4914 households that received a personalized greeting when 
analyzing the data.     29
feelings of guilt (or the realization of composite utility) are enhanced during face to face 
interaction.  In contrast, our mail solicitations provide individuals “moral wiggle room,” 
as contribution decisions are made privately and are not directly observed by an 
expecting outsider.  This makes it easier for the marginal agent to opt out of giving.  
Thus, we observe lower overall participation rates and higher conditional contribution 
levels in our mail study.  In this regard, our results are consistent with recent laboratory 
evidence suggesting the importance of context on social preferences (see, e.g., Jason 
Dana et al., 2005; Edward Lazear et al., 2006).
22   
  Having used a comparison of mail and door-to-door solicitations to highlight the 
importance of social pressures on donor behavior, we now examine whether insights 
regarding the loyalty of previous donors translates across appeal modes.  In this spirit, 
consider the third and fourth panels of Table 6 which summarize contribution decisions 
in our mail solicitation by household type—warm or cold list.  In total, we mailed 
personalized letters to 399 warm-list households and received contributions from six (or 
approximately 1.5 percent) of these individuals for an average donation of approximately 
$0.83 per solicitation.  In contrast, only 0.13 percent (6 of 4515) of the cold list 
households receiving a letter from the Hazard Center contributed in our mail campaign 
and the average gift amongst these households was $0.05 per letter.  While both of these 
differences are significant at the p < 0.05 level, the small number of donors across both 
household types precludes strong inference.
23       
                                                 
22 Of course, the door-to-door approach might also lower transactions costs and provide solicitees with a 
clearer “channel” to give, both of which would lead to a similar data pattern. 
23 Interestingly, every warm-list household that contributes in the mail campaign was originally approached 
in a charitable lottery.  This suggests that, as in the door-to-door campaign, agents initially attracted via 
mechanisms that signal charitable quality are more likely to contribute and provide larger average gifts in 
future fund-raising drives.   30
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
  Economists have only recently begun to explore the basics of charitable giving.  
Fundamental insights pertaining to why people give to certain causes, why they remain 
loyal, and why they compose their gifts in the temporal profiles observed remain beyond 
most theoretical models.  This study seeks to make a modest advance by linking 
charitable contributions across separate field experiments over time.  In doing so, we are 
able to explore the long-run dynamics of charitable fund-raising apart from the short-run 
substitution effects observed in previous fund-raising field experiments.  
Empirical results emphasize not only the value of securing a warm list but also the 
critical importance of how fund-raisers secure initial contributions.  Donors initially 
attracted via economic mechanisms are more loyal to the cause than those attracted via 
non-mechanism factors, such as solicitor physical attractiveness.  Yet such loyalty is 
mitigated when prior donors are provided extrinsic incentives, such as a token gift.   
Together, these results begin to shed light on the question posed in the title of this study, 
of which we can supply a definitive “it depends.”  Our results suggest that a charity 
prefers a donor in hand to two in the bush when (i) they do not have access to donor gifts, 
(ii) the donor was initially attracted via an economic mechanism, and (iii) the approach 
minimizes variation in the non-institutional factors that influence composite (warm-glow) 
utility.  Conversely, a charity prefers two donors in the bush when (i) they have access to 
donor gifts, (ii) the donor was initially attracted via a mechanism that runs through the 
composite utility term, and (iii) the approach introduces large changes in the non-
institutional factors underlying composite utility.      31
From a methodological viewpoint, our study showcases the usefulness of moving 
beyond an experimental design that focuses on short run substitution effects.  While the 
literature has learned a great deal from that approach, a complementary framework that 
explores both short-run and long-run treatment effects can potentially provide a deeper 
understanding of many economic issues that our theoretical models are built to describe. 
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Note:  Each cell represents one unique session in which we gathered data using one of the three treatments.  
For example, row 1, column 1, denotes that session one of the VCM treatment employed six solicitors that 
approached a total of 168 houses, of which 69 answered the door. 
 
* In this treatment the solicitors only worked 2 hours before quitting due to illness.     36
Table 2: Summary Statistics – Door-to-Door Solicitations 







Contribution Decisions     
All Data Pooled     
Households (HH’s) Approached  878 1148  1142 
Total HH’s Home  286 383 370 
% of HH’s Donating  21.3% 27.4%  30% 
Average Donation  $1.90 $1.82 $3.68 
Avg. Conditional Donation  $8.92 $6.65  $12.26 
Warm List Only     
HH’s Approached  74 98  102 
Total HH’s Home  40 60 51 
% of HH’s Donating  40% 40%  35.3% 
Average Donation  $4.75 $1.65 $4.37 
Avg. Conditional Donation  $11.88 $4.13 $12.38 
Avg. Previous Donation  $4.19 $3.28 $4.73 
% from Previous VCM  32.5% 16.7% 41.2% 
% from Previous Lottery  67.5% 83.3% 58.8% 
Cold List Only     
HH’s Approached  804 1050  1030 
Total HH’s Home  246 323 319 
% of HH’s Donating  18.3% 25.1% 29.2% 
Average Donation  $1.44 $1.86 $3.56 
Avg. Conditional Donation  $7.87 $7.40  $12.23 
Solicitor Characteristics     
Total Number of Solicitors  19 24 16 
% of White Male Solicitors  10.5% 16.7% 12.5% 
Mean Beauty Rating  0.01 0.006 0.02 
% of White Female Solicitors  42.1% 33.3% 37.5% 
Mean Beauty Rating  0.09 0.18 0.07 
% of Minority Male Solicitors  21.1% 25%  25% 
Mean Beauty Rating  0.03 -0.08 -0.03 
% of Minority Female Solicitors  26.3% 25%  25% 
Mean Beauty Rating  0.005 -0.001 -0.003 
Household Characteristics     
% of White Males  45.5% 42.5% 39.2% 
% of White Females  51.0% 45.6% 48.1% 
% of Minority Males  1.0% 6.9% 6.2% 
% of Minority Females  2.5% 5.0% 6.5% 
 Estimated Average Age  44.13 44.25 41.95 
 
Note:  Figures in the table represent summary statistics across the different treatments.   37
Table 3:  Average Donation per Household (HH) – Fixed Effects Regression Models 
























Indicator for a Warm List Household  1.29** 
(0.59) 
  





Indicator for a Warm List HH in a 




Indicator for a Warm List HH in a 




Indicator for a Warm List HH from a 
Prior VCM 
   0.65 
(1.02) 
Indicator for a Warm List HH from a 
Prior Lottery 
   1.57** 
(0.69) 
      
Solicitor Fixed Effects  Yes - 32  Yes - 32  Yes – 32 
      
Observations 1039  1039  1039 
R-Squared 0.02  0.03  0.02 
 
** Denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
 
Note: Cell entries provide parameter estimates for a fixed effects linear regression model of contribution 
levels (including the zeroes) for our experiment.  Cell entries can be read as follows – average contribution 
levels in our small gift treatments are approximately $0.41 less than those in our baseline VCM treatment.     38
Table 4:  Probability of Contributing – Fixed Effects Regression Model 
























Indicator for a Warm List Household  0.13** 
(0.04) 
  





Indicator for a Warm List HH in a 




Indicator for a Warm List HH in a 




Indicator for a Warm List HH from a 
Prior VCM 
   0.05 
(0.07) 
Indicator for a Warm List HH from a 
Prior Lottery 
   0.17** 
(0.04) 
      
Solicitor Fixed Effects  Yes - 32  Yes - 32  Yes – 32 
      
Observations 1039  1039  1039 
R-Squared 0.02  0.02  0.02 
 
** Denotes statistical significance at the p < 0.05 level 
 
Note: Cell entries provide parameter estimates for a fixed effects model estimating the dichotomous 
decision of whether or not a household made a contribution to the Hazards Center.  Cell entries can be read 
as follows – agents in a small gift treatment are 13 percent more likely on average to contribute to the 
Hazards Center than in the VCM.  
   39
Table 5:  Changing Incentives in the Long-Run: Difference in Differences Estimates 
  Donation Donation  Prior  Difference 
Prior Lottery 















Diff-in-Diff     1.95* 
(1.31) 
     
Remove WF Beauty 







Add WF Beauty 







Diff-in-Diff     2.20 
(2.24) 
     
Remove Fem Beauty 







Add Fem Beauty 







Diff-in-Diff     0.22 
(1.56) 
* Denotes statistical significance at p < 0.10 level 
 
Note: Cell entries provide average contribution levels for current and prior donation levels for warm-list 
households in our data with standard errors in parentheses.  The final column provides the difference in 
contributions across the two campaigns including the associated difference-in-differences estimate.   40
Table 6: Summary Statistics – Mail Solicitation 




All Data Pooled     
Letters Mailed 1837 3783  943 
Total Letters Returned 2 6 4 
% of HH’s Donating 0.11% 0.15% 0.42% 
Average Donation $0.07 $0.06 $0.21 
Avg. Conditional Donation $62.50 $40.00 $48.75 
All Addresses with Names     
Letters Mailed 1363 2831  720 
Total Letters Returned 2 6 4 
% of HH’s Donating 0.15% 0.21% 0.56% 
Average Donation $0.09 $0.08 $0.27 
Avg. Conditional Donation $62.50 $40.00 $48.75 
Cold List with Names     
Letters Mailed 1256 2596  663 
Total Letters Returned 1 3 2 
% of HH’s Donating 0.08% 0.152 0.30% 
Average Donation $0.08 $0.03 $0.08 
Avg. Conditional Donation $100.00 $25.67  $25.00 
Warm List with Names     
Letters Mailed 107 235  57 
Total Letters Returned 1 3 2 
% of HH’s Donating 0.93% 1.3% 3.51% 
Average Donation $0.24 $0.68 $2.54 
Avg. Conditional Donation $25.00 $53.33 $72.50 
 
Note: Figures in the table represent summary statistics across the various treatments.   41
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Appendix A – Solicitation Scripts and Informational Brochure 
 
- Hi, my name is _____________________. I am an ECU student visiting Pitt County 
households today on behalf of the ECU Center for Natural Hazards Research.  
 
- The Hazard Center provides support and coordination for research on natural 
hazard risks, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and flooding.   
 
- Our newsletter describes recent research initiatives in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, 
and the Center’s mission. 
 
- The primary goal of the center is to reduce the loss of life and property damages 
due to severe weather events.  
 
- We are collecting contributions today on behalf of the ECU Hazards Center.  
 
(Unconditional Small Gift Treatment – Added Sentence) 
 
As a gift from the Hazard Center, please accept this handsome bookmark. 
 
(Conditional Small Gift Treatment – Added Sentence) 
 
If you make a donation today, we will give you this handsome bookmark. 
 
(Unconditional Large Gift – Added Sentence) 
 
As a gift from the Hazard Center, please accept this copy of the Bestselling book 
FREAKONOMICS. 
 
(Conditional Large Gift Treatment – Added Sentence) 
 
If you make a donation today, we will give you a copy of the Bestselling book 
FREAKONOMICS 
 
- The Center is a non-profit organization and these funds will be used to conduct 
research that benefits Pitt County and the surrounding area. 
 
- Would you like to make a contribution today? 
 
(If you receive a contribution, please write a receipt that includes their name and 
contribution amount. If the resident asks, contributions are tax deductible). 
 
- If you have questions regarding the Center or want additional information, visit the web 
site listed in the newsletter.  
 
Thank you.   44
ECU Center for Natural Hazards Research- Informational Brochure 
 
   45
 
 
   46
Appendix B – Solicitation Letter Small Gift Treatment 
 
 